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We are able to extract detailed information from mental images that we were not explicitly
aware of during encoding. For example, we can discover a new figure when we rotate a
previously seen image in our mind. However, such discoveries are not “really” new but
just new “interpretations.” In two recent publications, we have shown that mental imagery
can lead to perceptual learning (Tartaglia et al., 2009, 2012). Observers imagined the cen-
tral line of a bisection stimulus for thousands of trials. This training enabled observers to
perceive bisection offsets that were invisible before training. Hence, it seems that per-
ceptual learning via mental imagery leads to new percepts. We will argue, however, that
these new percepts can occur only within “known” models. In this sense, perceptual
learning via mental imagery exceeds new discoveries in mental images. Still, the effects
of mental imagery on perceptual learning are limited. Only perception can lead to really
new perceptual experience.
Keywords: ambiguous figure, bisection, combinatorics, interpolation, mental rotation, top-down processing,
perceptual learning
Imagination is more important than knowledge. For knowledge is
limited, whereas imagination embraces the entire world, stimulating
progress, giving birth to evolution.
(Albert Einstein, 1929)
MENTAL IMAGERY
Mental imagery is usually referred to as seeing with the mind’s
eye. We are able to create images in our mind despite the absence
of appropriate sensory stimulation. Mental images are usually
described introspectively, using a sensory terminology such as
form, color, spatial extent, and so forth. Even though introspec-
tion does not necessarily allow for drawing conclusions about the
underlying mechanisms recent research has shown that people
have a good metacognitive understanding of the vividness of their
mental images (Pearson and Tong, 2011).
The mechanisms that underlie mental imagery have become the
topic of the“Imagery Debate”(see for example Kosslyn et al., 2003;
Pylyshyn, 2003). Cognitive psychologists have carried out a large
amount of behavioral experiments to tap into the mechanisms
that underlie mental imagery, and the results provide compelling
evidence that mental imagery shares common mechanisms with
visual perception. For example, it has been shown that men-
tal images preserve spatial distances. In experiments on image
scanning, participants had to first memorize visual information
shown in a picture (e.g., a map of an island) and later answer
questions about landmarks (Kosslyn et al., 1978). Interestingly,
response times were proportional to the actual distances between
the landmarks. It took participants more time to scan longer dis-
tances. Hence, participants were able to extract metric distance
information from memory. Yet other experiments have shown
that participants are well able to judge and compare distances in
mental images. For example, when participants indicate whether a
previously seen object is higher than wide (e.g., a picture of a sail-
boat) they are able to extract this information from mental images
even though they did not attend to the spatial dimensions when
they encoded the visual stimulus (Kosslyn et al., 1995). It has been
argued that participants learned the stimuli beforehand, and that
tacit knowledge about the purpose of the experiment could have
led to the findings. Finke and Pinker (1982) showed participants
an array of dots. After the dots disappeared, an arrow was pre-
sented and participants decided whether or not the arrow pointed
to one of the dots they just saw. Response times increased linearly
with increasing distance between the arrow and the target dot. It
has been proposed that attentional crowding could account for the
distance effect, leading to more difficult discriminations for fur-
ther distances (Pylyshyn, 2002). However, this possible explanation
has been ruled out by Dror and Kosslyn (1993) who conducted a
modified version of Finke and Pinker’s experiment. They replaced
dots by black (3) and white (17) squares which were arranged in
a square-like configuration (six squares on each side). The task
remained the same as in Finke and Pinker’s experiment but the
distance between the black squares was chosen so that it exceeded
the distance known to produce attentional crowding (Intriliga-
tor and Cavanagh, 2001). As expected, Dror and Kosslyn (1993)
demonstrated that response times increased with increasing dis-
tance between the arrow and the square. Hence, their results
confirmed that mental images embody metric properties even
when no spatial relationships are encoded explicitly during the
presentation of the stimulus. Yet other evidence comes from neu-
roimaging studies showing a large overlap in activated areas during
mental imagery and visual perception, including early visual cor-
tex (e.g., Slotnick et al., 2005). Activation in the latter has been
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found when participants were engaged in mental imagery tasks
that required the extraction of high-resolution visual information.
In addition, TMS over the occipital cortex disrupted performance
in those tasks (Kosslyn et al., 1999). Thus, there is compelling evi-
dence for commonalities between mental imagery and perception.
However, it has to be pointed out that there are also differences,
and, for example, only rarely do we confuse images with percepts.
The discovery of new information is yet another conceivable dif-
ference between mental imagery and perception. When we inspect
with our eyes a visual scene new information is picked up con-
tinuously. We discover more and more details that are part of the
visual scene. It has been argued that new discoveries cannot be
made in mental imagery (Chambers and Reisberg, 1985, 1992).
A mental image contains nothing new besides the information
the observer is aware of when generating the image. Ambiguous
figures, for example, demonstrate compellingly that the percep-
tual interpretation of the same visual stimulus can switch from
one explanation to another. Observers usually do not notice the
alternative perceptual explanation when first viewing the ambigu-
ous figure. Obviously, new discoveries occur in perception. What
about mental images? Are people able to discover new information
in mental images? Mast and Kosslyn (2002) used an ambiguous
figure in which the alternative perceptual explanation was upside
down (young lady, old lady). It was almost impossible to discover
the second explanation (e.g., young lady upside down) acciden-
tally during encoding. However, roughly 50% of participants were
able to discover in their mental image a new upright interpre-
tation after having mentally rotated the image by 180˚. None of
the participants was aware about the alternative explanation when
they learned the image (in one orientation only). Hence, observers
discovered a new interpretation that they were not aware of when
encoding the image. Thus, the ability to extract new interpretations
is not bound to the process of perception as it can occur just as
well during mental imagery. The ability to discover new interpre-
tations in images is not the crucial difference between imagery and
perception. Mental images are not interpreted entities as claimed
by Fodor (1975) and they are not tied to their initial interpretation
assigned during image generation. Indeed, participants were not
aware of the second interpretation in the image even though all
the information was available in the stimulus they encoded. Hence,
only a new interpretation but no new information was discovered.
Here is another example. Imagine a letter “D” and rotate it coun-
terclockwise by 90˚, and then take the letter “J” and attach it to the
rotated “D” so that the upper end of the “J” is attached exactly at
the middle of the horizontal line in the rotated “D.” What does
it look like? An umbrella. The umbrella does not make part of its
individual constituents (D, J) but still people are able to extract the
shape from the configuration created in imagery. Indeed, a major
strength of mental imagery is the ability to recombine informa-
tion, thus, going beyond perceptual experience. Therefore, mental
imagery serves an important function in creative thinking. How-
ever, the detection of emergent new shapes in imagery still remains
in the realm of potential interpretations.
This article focuses on the relation between mental imagery
and perceptual learning. At first glance, these topics appear some-
what unrelated but we were able to demonstrate in a series
of experiments the existence of perceptual learning via mental
imagery. Perceptual learning without perceptual input opens
new ways of using mental imagery in learning paradigms, thus
challenging classical views on perceptual learning. The fact that
mental imagery and visual perception share – at least in part –
the same mechanisms extends to learning and memory. We
gathered evidence that learning in imagery transfers to percep-
tual performance (Tartaglia et al., 2009, 2012). The next para-
graph will provide an overview of perceptual learning, and focus
on the implications that learning via mental imagery has on
the current understanding of mental imagery and perception
alike.
PERCEPTUAL LEARNING
Perceptual learning is learning to perceive. Sommeliers can taste
not only the grape of a wine but often the year of its production
and vineyard. Years of training make the master. In the laboratory,
training improves basic visual skills including the discrimination
of motion direction (Ball and Sekuler, 1987), the detection of
Gabor gratings (Sowden et al., 2002), stereoacuity (Fendick and
Westheimer, 1983; Kumar and Glaser, 1993), line orientation judg-
ments (Vogels and Orban, 1985), texture discrimination (Karni
and Sagi, 1991; Pourtois et al., 2008) and the discrimination of
fine spatial features, such as in vernier acuity (Fahle and Edelman,
1993). Another example are bisection stimuli where a central line
is closer to one of two outer lines (Figure 1). Observers indicate the
offset direction (to the left or to the right). Training can strongly
improve offset discrimination (Figure 1).
Without phylogenetic or ontogenetic perceptual learning, there
is no perception (Herzog and Esfeld, 2009). Kittens that were raised
in an environment missing horizontal lines during a critical period
were blind for the horizontal orientation for the rest of their entire
life (Blakemore and Cooper, 1970; Hirsh and Spinelli, 1970). In
this respect, perceptual learning is often thought to be the most
basic type of learning.
The mechanisms that underlie perceptual learning are contro-
versially debated. However, there is clear consensus that perceptual
learning is driven by the repeated exposure to the stimuli. Only
repeated wine tastings make a good sommelier. On the neural
level, the presentation of a stimulus leads to changes of synaptic
weights which may, for example, fine tune receptive fields (e.g.,
Fahle, 2005) or enhance gating to decision stages (e.g., Herzog
and Fahle, 1998; Lu and Dosher, 2004). Top-down aspects, such
as attention, may be crucial in perceptual learning, but they are
only modifying, but not driving the synaptic changes. For exam-
ple, attention selects aspects of the stimuli to be learned, but the
learning itself is driven by the stimuli.
In all mathematical models of perceptual learning, there is a
stimulus related term essential for learning. In unsupervised learn-
ing algorithms, as for example in Hebbian learning, the synaptic
changes∆w j depend only on the concurrent activation of neurons:
∆wj = η · yµxµj
where xµj is the activity of the j-th input neuron in response to
stimulusµ and yµj is the activity of the output neuron in response
to the same stimulus (η is the learning rate); yµj is the weighted
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FIGURE 1 | (A) In line bisection, a spatial interval, delineated by two outer
lines, is bisected in two unequal components by a central line. The task of the
observer is to judge whether the central line is closer to the left or right outer
line. Observers are asked to give their response by using one of two buttons.
(B) Performance improves with training, i.e., observers become able to
discriminate offset sizes indiscriminable before training. (C) Another way of
measuring improvements of performance is to compare observers’
performance before (“pre-training”) and after (“post-training”) the training
phase. Post-training baselines are significantly higher than pre-training
baselines.
sum of the input yµj = Σwj *xµj and hence fully determined by
the actual input and the synaptic weights w j. If no stimuli are
presented xj= 0, for all j, i.e., there is no activation of the input
layer and hence no learning since ∆wj= 0, for all j. Hence, no
perceptual learning is expected in the absence of stimulus pre-
sentation. Similar considerations hold for other types of neural
networks of perceptual learning.
However, contrary to all previous thinking in perceptual learn-
ing research, our recent experiments showed that perceptual learn-
ing can occur in the absence of (proper) stimulus presentation
when participants imagine the missing perceptual information
(Tartaglia et al., 2009, 2012). For example, we used a modified
bisection stimulus in which only the outer lines were presented
during training (Figure 2). Observers were asked to imagine the
center line to be offset either to the left or right depending on
a tone provided in addition (a high tone was associated to the
right offset, a low tone to the left one). Hence, the physical stim-
ulus was always the same in all trials. There was “nothing” to
learn from the stimulus itself. Still, performance improved dur-
ing mental imagery, as determined by pre- and post-training
measurements in which the proper bisection stimulus was pre-
sented (Figure 2). Hence, mental imagery is sufficient to enable
perceptual learning.
The improvements during training are not caused by the pre-
and post-measurements with the full bisection stimulus because
measurements without training did not yield any performance
gains (see Tartaglia et al., 2009). But is it really mental imagery that
improves performance in perceptual learning? Unspecific effects
such as better coping with attention and improved decision mak-
ing need to be controlled for. We performed a control experiment
with (almost) the same stimuli but without imagery during train-
ing. During the training phase, again only the two vertical outer
lines of the bisection were presented, together with the two dif-
ferent tones. Observers had to press the right button when a
high-frequency tone was presented and the left button when a low-
frequency tone was presented. We did not ask observers to imagine
the central line of the bisection stimulus. To ensure observers’
attention to the stimuli, the outer lines were only half as long as
normal in a few trials (0, 1, or 2 within a block of 80 trials). At the
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FIGURE 2 | (A,C) Pre- and Post-training baseline measurements with the
“proper” vertical bisection stimulus. (B) Imagery training. Only the two
outer lines of the bisection stimulus are presented. Observers are asked to
imagine the absent central line to be offset either to the left or to the right,
depending on a tone, and to push buttons accordingly. We asked observers
to imagine the smallest possible offset; the imagined line is indicated by
the dashed line (which was not shown in the actual display). (D)
Performance improved significantly through training. The error bars indicate
the standard error of the mean (SEM) for nine observers. Adapted from
Tartaglia et al. (2009).
end of each block, observers were required to report the number
of trials with shorter lines. The physical stimulation was identical
to the imagery experiment (except for the 0–2 lines deviating per
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FIGURE 3 | (A,C) Pre and Post-training baseline measurements with the
proper vertical bisection stimulus. (B) Counting lines. Only the two outer
lines were presented. Observers were asked to press the right button
when a high-frequency tone was presented and the left button for a
low-frequency tone. In addition, observers were asked to count the number
of trials with shorter lines (0, 1, or 2 out of 80 trials per block). No imagery
was involved in this experiment. (D) No significant improvement of
performance occurred through training for the vertical bisection. The error
bars indicate the standard error of the mean (SEM) for six observers.
Adapted from Tartaglia et al. (2009).
block; Figure 3). Performance did not improve in this condition
(Figure 3). Hence, it is the mental imagery training that leads to
perceptual learning. Further experiments demonstrated percep-
tual learning via mental imagery for Gabor and motion stimuli
(Tartaglia et al., 2009, 2012).
Interestingly, perceptual learning via motion imagery improves
coherent motion discrimination of moving dots when a blank
screen is presented. However, no improvement occurs when,
instead of a blank screen, randomly moving dots are presented
during training (Tartaglia et al., 2012). Contrary to motion stim-
uli perceptual learning in the bisection task requires the presence
of the two outer lines during training. Without the lines, perfor-
mance does not improve. In mental imagery studies with static
stimuli, it is often the case that a perceptual reference is needed
(see the role of perceptual assistance shown in other studies,
e.g., Intons-Peterson, 1981; Mast et al., 1999). Future research
will better define the conditions under which mental imagery
training will unfold its impact on perceptual learning. Taken
together, it is possible to learn to see things that were not vis-
ible before imagery training. Thus, is perceptual learning via
mental imagery truly creating new percepts? We will argue: yes
and no.
A  B  C  
FIGURE 4 |The dot world. (A) Three dots are presented that appear to be
aligned. (B) After extended training, observers can easily discriminate the
offset direction of the center dot. Perceptual learning has made spatial
differences visible that were not visible before. (C) Nine dots are presented.
In this display,
(
9
3
) = 84 tasks with positional changes of three dots can be
defined (the other six dots constitute the background). In general, 29 tasks
can be defined for 9 dots. In displays with n dots, hence, 2n tasks can be
defined leading to 2n objects that one can potentially learn to perceive.(
n
k
) = n!
k(n−k)! with n!=1*2*3*. . . *n. From Herzog and Esfeld (2009).
COMBINATORICS
In Figures 4A,B a 3-dot vernier is shown for which training
improves performance (Fahle and Morgan, 1996). In Figure 4C,
a set of nine dots is shown for which 84 3-dot vernier tasks can
be defined and trained. Because of the specificity of perceptual
learning, we expect no or very little transfer between tasks. Also 2
or 8-dot vernier tasks can be defined. In general, 256 vernier tasks
can be defined by the 9-dot display. For 52 dots, there are more
tasks than all the milliseconds in the universe that passed by since
big bang. Hence, very small sets of elements can create very large
combinatorial spaces.
We propose that mental imagery operates within such combi-
natorial spaces. The landmarks of the island that were memorized
in the Kosslyn et al. (1978) experiment span a combinatorial space.
Imagery does not add any new basic elements (e.g., a light tower)
but computes, for example, second order aspects such as path
lengths. In this sense, imagery does not create anything new. It just
makes implicit aspects explicit. However, combinatorial spaces are
large, often virtually infinite. Hence, the majority of combinato-
rial facts will remain unknown because only a small margin can
be computed. In this sense, imagery produces new knowledge that
may be unique to a certain person at a given moment in time.
On the first glance, it may appear as if perceptual learning via
mental imagery can lead to really new percepts, as in the bisection
stimulus where participants learn to perceive offsets that were not
visible before. However, as mentioned above, without perceptual
assistance provided by the outer lines, mental imagery training
did not lead to perceptual learning. It seems that perceptual learn-
ing via mental imagery occurs within a model consisting of the
two outer lines and the metric space in between. It is possible
that the brain learns to better read out information from cod-
ing the center line. Hence, perceptual learning via mental imagery
creates new percepts. However, these basic percepts are not so
much different from detecting a new face in a mental image that
was not visible during encoding. Still, all these percepts are new
in the virtually infinite combinatorial space of things that can
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be learned and perceived. Once we have made the perceptual
experience new knowledge can emerge from the combinatorial
space. Really new percepts, however, are based on experience and
they cannot be traced back to previous visual percepts. At this
point, however, we enter the realm of philosophy and, admit-
tedly, the definition of what a new percept is remains a debatable
issue.
CONCLUSION
Mental imagery can create new percepts via perceptual learning.
The examples we summarized here can be explained by mental
imagery relying on a generating model combining and changing
past percepts. This would allow for creating infinite numbers of
new percepts within vast combinatorial spaces. We suggest that
only perception can generate really new percepts in the sense of
model free extrapolation.
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